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There is overwhelming evidence that the evaluation of both reward decisions and their
associated outcomes are closely linked with bilateral activation of the ventral striatum,
with these insights stemming from tasks such as the monetary incentive delay task
for lotteries and multiround Trust Games for social settings. The essential element in
these tasks is an externally provided cue associated with specific gains/trustworthy
partners and losses/non-trustworthy partners. However, in reality people typically use
their own beliefs to guide their decision-making and assess the likelihood of positive or
and negative outcomes. As when participants assess the relationship between cues and
rewards, individuals should anticipate rewards in correspondence to their beliefs, i.e., the
higher the belief of obtaining a reward in the future, the higher the anticipation of reward.
In this study, we use decision-makers’ own, naturally occurring, beliefs about both
social and non-social contexts to examine the subsequent outcome of their choices.
We hypothesize that mechanisms of belief-mediated reward processing are mediated
by neural activation in the ventral striatum. An essential feature of our design is the
elicitation of individuals’ beliefs prior to the decision-making task itself. Furthermore,
our incentivized, non-deceptive, decision-making task distinguishes between social –
implemented by a Trust Game – and non-social sources, as well as risk and ambiguity
as underlying types of uncertainty. Our main result shows that individual beliefs regarding
reciprocity likelihoods in both the Trust Game and the lottery influence the amount
invested. Subsequently, only the investment amount in the Trust Game parametrically
modulates anticipatory reward and outcome evaluation in the ventral striatum. This
study demonstrates a first approach at using participants’ subjective sets of beliefs to
examine reward processing. We discuss its potential promise, outline some limitations,
and propose follow-up studies to extend the current approach.
Keywords: trust, beliefs, reward, risk, uncertainty, ventral striatum
INTRODUCTION
Decision-making under conditions of uncertainty, that is, when we do not know the exact
future outcome of our choices, is generally guided by beliefs we have about the world at large
(Savage, 1954). These beliefs typically act as subjective probabilities, derived from a combination
of specific prior knowledge, received information, and expertise in a particular domain
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 June 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 660
fnins-13-00660 June 24, 2019 Time: 15:17 # 2
Fairley et al. Subjective Beliefs About Trust
(Fox and Tversky, 1995; Fox and Weber, 2002). For example,
imagine you want to invest part of your capital in a mutual fund.
There are thousands of options, but after reading many sources
of information you select a few mutual funds. You will only learn
if your assessment of these selected mutual funds was satisfactory
after evaluating their quarterly holdings. While this is a difficult
task in itself, the choice process can be even more complicated
when decisions are made in direct interaction with another
person, for example when we are deciding to trust or reciprocate
with other people. To extend our previous example, imagine, as
an alternative to investing in mutual funds, you opt to invest part
of your capital in some startup businesses. You carefully decide
which proposals to select based on your expectations about
which entrepreneurs will successfully execute their business plan.
However, you will only learn if your expectations were correct
when, after several months or years, you receive the financial
statements of the companies you funded. In particular, you are
interested in reviewing the projects you expected to do well and
for which you anticipated a high return on investment.
Decision-makers only ever get a full picture of the relationship
between their beliefs and decisions by examining the eventual
outcomes of these choices, which then offer the opportunity to
learn whether their initial expectations were met, or whether
they had in fact incorrectly assessed them. Prior to learning
the actual outcomes however, one can imagine that anticipated
rewards might increase in correspondence to an individual’s
beliefs, i.e., the higher the beliefs of obtaining a reward in the
future, the higher the anticipation of reward.
Though many studies have investigated the neural
underpinnings of reward anticipation and outcome delivery with
tasks such as the monetary incentive delay task (MID; Knutson
et al., 2000) or the card guessing task (Delgado et al., 2000) in
a lottery context, or a repeated Trust Game in a social context,
to the best of our knowledge there has been no exploration to
date of using decision-makers’ own, subjective, beliefs about the
evaluation and subsequent outcome of their choices. Therefore,
in this study we investigate reward anticipation and outcome
when the reward “cue” is a function of prior internal evaluations
as opposed to the standard method of using an externally
provided cue association.
When we refer to beliefs, specifically we mean participants’
inherent priors, which are not manipulated in any way in this
study, but which have formed based on previous personal,
likely idiosyncratic, experiences. Our procedure is therefore
different from studies which explicitly let participants form
priors based on some experimental interaction, for instance a
ball-tossing game with fictional players and specific behaviors
(Fareri et al., 2012) or vivid descriptions of partners’ life
events as to establish moral characters (Delgado et al., 2005).
Furthermore, our study does not investigate social learning per
se, as here the decision-making and outcome phase are separated
in time (Fareri et al., 2012, 2015). After the outcome phase,
participants review their prior decisions, but, importantly, do so
without the possibility to change these previous choices. This
has the effect of minimizing learning processes that may take
place during the experimental process, as this is not the key
feature of our study.
In tasks like the aforementioned MID and card guessing task,
the decision-maker must perform a certain action correctly –
a rapid reaction time in the MID and a correct guess in the
card task – in order to receive a monetary reward. The essential
feature of these games is that, before the required action, players
learn that certain visual cues are associated with specific gains
or losses, indicating either how large the monetary reward is or
how much they can avoid losing if they perform the required task
successfully. In the social domain, similar cues can be provided to
denote a good or bad social partner. For instance, in Fouragnan
et al. (2013), participants were told that triangles indicated game
partners with low scores in a social orientation task, whereas
circles indicated high social orientation scores.
Here, we are interested in naturally occurring individual
beliefs, not induced by establishing specific cue-outcome
relations. We examined these beliefs in the context of a decision-
making task which distinguishes between both sources and types
of uncertainty. We define sources here as uncertainty measured
in social and non-social settings, which we operationalize with a
Trust Game and a lottery mechanism, respectively.
In the Trust Game a sender invests a certain amount with a
receiver based on beliefs she has regarding the receiver’s likely
reciprocation, and therefore tries to reason about her partner’s
trustworthiness. In the lottery context, the investor will analyze
how much to invest with a random mechanistic device and
is likely to use introspection, based on (any) experience with
outcomes decided via such mechanisms, for example roulette or
a coin toss. By using participants’ own belief sets it could be
that participants rely more on these beliefs in a social context
(Chang and Sanfey, 2011). That is, for example, correct beliefs
regarding lottery outcomes are perceived as good luck, yet
correct beliefs in a social situation are more likely perceived
as a signal of personal success in properly assessing the social
situation (Trautmann et al., 2008). Therefore, we are interested
here in investigating whether social and non-social sources of
uncertainty may influence belief-mediated anticipatory rewards
in different ways.
In addition to exploring the relative sources of uncertainty, our
study also distinguishes between types of uncertainty. By types
of uncertainty, we refer to risk and ambiguity, which are events
characterized by known objective probabilities and unknown
probabilities, respectively (Wakker, 2010). A few studies have
focused on the neural differences of anticipated rewards when
cue-reward pairs are associated with either known probabilities
(risk) or unknown probabilities (ambiguity). These studies show
a distinct pattern of brain activation between anticipatory
rewards under conditions of risk vs. ambiguity (Volz et al., 2003;
Tobler et al., 2006), and are in line with primate studies which
show that dopaminergic modulation of rewards varies across
probability distributions (Fiorillo et al., 2003). By employing
two types of uncertainty in this study, we can investigate
both anticipated rewards that are a function of participants’
subjective beliefs (ambiguity), as well as objective probabilities
we provide (risk).
In humans, the neural mechanisms of both the evaluation
of reward decisions and their associated outcomes are
mostly observed by bilateral activation of the ventral
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striatum (Bartra et al., 2013). This activity has been observed in
a wide variety of outcome modalities. For example, activation in
the ventral striatum, whose axons receive dopaminergic input
from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) in the midbrain (Schultz,
1998), has been observed for monetary rewards (Knutson et al.,
2001; Knutson and Greer, 2008), food (O’Doherty et al., 2002;
Hare et al., 2008, 2009), social cooperation (Rilling et al., 2004;
Davey et al., 2009; Jones et al., 2011; Korn et al., 2012; Lin
et al., 2012; Powers et al., 2013) and even the punishment of
others (Singer et al., 2006). Relatedly, in multiround trust games,
Bellucci et al. (2017) found in a meta-analysis that the decision to
trust also activated the ventral striatum, which they inferred to be
likely associated with reward prediction error signals. However,
during the feedback stage of this task, the dorsal striatum was
active, which according to the authors was likely related to
reinforcement learning processes.
In a similar manner to how anticipatory reward mechanisms
operate when a previously learned cue is presented, we expect that
people anticipate rewards when awaiting outcomes of decisions
that were mediated by specific internal beliefs. When the investor
in our earlier example anticipates a higher return from certain
business projects, we would predict that these expectations would
lead to increased reward anticipation prior to learning how these
particular projects fared. Mechanistically, we hypothesize that
this process is mediated by activation in the ventral striatum
when participants are anticipating the potential outcome of their
rewards. Though anticipating rewards in both social and non-
social settings are thought to be processed in the striatum (Lin
et al., 2012), our earlier hypothesis that participants might rely
more on their beliefs in a social context could imply that we find
stronger activation in the ventral striatum comparing between
the Trust Game and a matched lottery task. With regard to types
of uncertainty, there is evidence that predicting outcomes under
various levels of uncertainty as compared to certainty activates
the ventral striatum bilaterally (Volz et al., 2003). Therefore,
with regard to ambiguity, we hypothesize greater ventral striatal
activation for the anticipation of ambiguous as compared to risky
outcomes. Lastly, during outcome delivery, we expect to observe
activation in the ventral striatum as a function of the magnitude
of the reward, that is, as a function of participant’s own earlier
investment choices.
To examine this question experimentally, namely the neural
mechanisms of belief-mediated anticipatory rewards and reward
outcomes, an essential feature of our design is the careful
elicitation of individual beliefs prior to decision-making. If we
observe that participants’ decisions are indeed guided by their
beliefs, we can then investigate the associated neural response
as participants await and receive the respective outcomes.
Importantly, this also optimally requires a clear and non-
deceptive incentive scheme, as dopaminergic modulation is
primarily observed when rewards are actually valuable in an
uncertain environment (Schultz, 2010).
Taken together, this study aims to test how internally
constructed beliefs, as opposed to objective cue-outcome
associations, impact the neural mechanisms of reward
anticipation and the subsequent delivery of rewards. Based on
substantial pre-existing evidence that both reward anticipation
and reward receipt are coded in the ventral striatum (Bartra et al.,
2013), we hypothesize that both belief-mediated anticipatory
rewards as well as reward receipt itself will activate the ventral
striatum. We explore this question using a novel incentivized
decision-making task that distinguishes between both types and
sources of uncertainty.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 26 participants (mean age = 22, 50% female) were
recruited for this study via the online recruitment system
SONA of the Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and
Behavior. Students with a psychology or economics background
were excluded due to concerns about, respectively, suspicions
regarding the veracity of the actual social interaction and a prior
detailed understanding of game theoretic behavior.
Three of the 26 participants were excluded from our sample
prior to analysis. One participant said that he did not believe
the real human interaction and the incentive scheme after
the experiment. Data for two participants were lost due to
technical issues; the head coil was not applied correctly and
the MRI data was not transferred appropriately. Furthermore,
three participants were removed after analyzing all behavioral
data as responses were very erratic, differed more than two
standard deviations from mean responses and revealed clear
misunderstandings (e.g., betting on scenarios with 0% chance
to win) in one case and no variation in investment levels in
the other two cases. Therefore, unless explicitly noted, analyses
reported here are based on 20 participants (mean age = 22, 11
females and 9 males). Finally, this study was approved by the local
ethical committee.
Design and Procedures
The full experiment consisted of two parts, a decision phase and
an outcome phase, separated by a short break. The focus of this
manuscript is on the outcome phase. As the outcomes stem from
the decision-making phase, we explain the setup below to be able
to explain how outcomes were presented to participants.
On each trial, participants received an endowment
of 10 tokens (which were later exchanged for cash).
Participants could decide to invest any number of these
tokens in either a human partner (social source) or a
lottery (non-social source), depending on the experimental
condition, with the investment amount then tripled by the
experimenter. Additionally, there were two different types
of uncertainty regarding the likelihood of their investment
being repaid, that of risk and of ambiguity. This resulted
in a total of four experimental conditions, explained
in detail below.
In the social condition, we employed a standard Trust Game
(Berg et al., 1995). The fMRI participant, termed the sender, had
their (tripled) investment transferred to another player, known
as the receiver. This receiver could then decide to either keep
all this investment, or return half of it to the sender. If half was
sent back, the sender was obviously better off than if they had
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transferred nothing, but at the time of decision faced uncertainty
as to whether the receiver would reciprocate his or her trust.
In the social context, participants placed an investment under
two types of uncertainty: they explicitly knew the probability of
being paired with a reciprocating receiver, known as the risky
trust game (RTG), or they did not receive any probabilistic
information regarding reciprocity, known as the ambiguous
trust game (ATG).
Receivers’ choices were collected during a behavioral session
prior to the fMRI experiment. Receivers made a binary choice to
either return or keep the investment should a positive investment
be received from the sender. Receivers could not condition
their choice on the different investment amounts the sender
could potentially invest with the receiver. Thereby our fMRI
participants, in their role as sender, only acted upon beliefs
regarding receivers’ trustworthy behavior, and their decisions
were not confounded by other potential motives, for example
signaling trust to receivers (McCabe et al., 2003) or eliciting
positive reciprocity (Houser et al., 2010).
In the non-social condition, participants’ outcomes were
resolved via a typical Ellsberg lottery design (Ellsberg, 1961).
They bet on the color of a marble drawn from an urn, with
this marble either a “winning” or “losing” color. Again, the
fMRI participant decided on a transfer, receiving back either
half of the tripled investment (if a winning colored marble was
drawn), or alternatively losing their entire investment (if a losing
colored marble was drawn). In this condition participants also
faced two types of uncertainty. In the risky lottery (RLOT),
participants knew the probabilities of drawing a marble with a
winning color, whereas in the ambiguous lottery (ALOT) this
probability was unknown.
We created risky and ambiguous trials in both social and non-
social contexts by introducing a group principle to the general
feature of the games discussed above. In the Trust Game, we
grouped nine decisions made by nine different receivers. One
receiver was randomly drawn from the pool of nine and matched
to the MRI participant’s investment choice. In the lottery, there
were nine marbles in the urn. One randomly drawn marble
from this urn determined if the participant received half of his
tripled investment.
In the social context participants have underlying prior
beliefs about the reciprocal behavior of receivers in general, and
receive the following information as part of the instructions.
We provided basic information regarding the pool of trustees,
e.g., age, gender, study, hobbies – which were answered by
the trustees after they had placed their reciprocating decision.
Any difference fMRI participants, in their role as trustor, reveal
about trustees’ reciprocating behavior is based on the same
information all of them received and is therefore likely the result
of differences in reciprocating behavior in general. Therefore it
is important that we control for these beliefs in order to rule
out inconsistencies in these underlying likelihoods and objective
probabilities across our four experimental settings. For instance,
imagine a sender who thinks that five out of nine receivers
are likely to reciprocate. If this participant is confronted with
a RTG where six out of nine receivers decided to transfer back
half of the investment, we cannot assess whether differences
FIGURE 1 | Each trial consists of six screens. Panel (A) is an example of a trial
from the ATG. The second screen indicates the source of uncertainty. Nine
silhouettes are displayed when participants are in a social context. Nine
marbles are displayed when participants face a lottery context Panel (B). The
fourth screen is the decision screen. They are instructed to decide how much
to transfer here. As the six possible transfer options appear in a random order
on the next screen, they are unable to prepare for a specific button press. On
the last screen we confirm their choice. In the ATG Panel (A) nine silhouettes
on a gray background indicate that no information is given about the
distribution of receivers that decided to send back half or keep the
investment. To illustrate the tailor-made structure of our design, we assume a
participant who believes three out of nine receivers will reciprocate. In the
ALOT Panel (C) the participant receives instruction that three out of nine
colors that can be used in any combination in this lottery are winning colors. In
this way we align underlying subjective probabilities between the ATG and
ALOT. In the risky trials we align individual’s beliefs to objective probabilities.
A participant who believes three out of nine receivers will reciprocate, will most
often face a RTG, which is composed of three receivers (green background)
that decided to send back half of any received investment versus six receivers
(red background) that decided to keep their investment Panel (D). Finally, in
the RLOT the urn is composed of all nine colors out of which three are
winning colors (green background) and six are losing colors (red background)
Panel (E).
in investment behaviors between both scenarios are caused by
the type of uncertainty, or by a mismatch between subjective
probability of 5/9 in the ATG and the objective probability of
6/9 in the RTG. Therefore, we elicited individual beliefs in the
ATG before participants made decisions in our experimental
setting. With an incentive-compatible belief elicitation technique
(quadratic scoring rule, e.g., see Schlag et al., 2015), we asked
how many receivers out of the pool of nine they thought
would reciprocate their investment. This belief is then used to
present participants with belief-corresponding scenarios in the
experimental settings. Essentially, individual beliefs entailed a
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FIGURE 2 | An outcome of an ATG trial. We took pictures of receivers while
they were seated behind a laptop. The pictures only show receivers’
silhouettes in black and white and no facial features are shown.
tailor-made trial structure for each participant (see Figure 1
for an overview and example of the experimental setup).
By implementing this feature, we made sure that beliefs are
aligned in our four settings. This enabled us to investigate
expected reward signals by examining the effect of both source
and type of uncertainty, taking into account participants’
naturally occurring beliefs.
To reiterate, we focus here solely on the outcome phase,
that is, the revealing of decision (either trust or lottery)
outcomes after all decisions have been made. Participants
passively reviewed their previously made choices and then
saw the respective outcome (see Figure 2 for a trial).
During this outcome phase our primary focus is on the
3500 ms time period when participants are reminded of their
earlier investment choice, and then await the outcome. We
term this moment the anticipation screen. They then see
the actual outcome of that trial, when a randomly selected
receiver (social condition) or marble (non-social condition)
is selected (final screen Figure 2, henceforth referred to as
the outcome screen). A selected receiver or marble highlighted
in green indicates a winning trial, and when colored red
indicates a losing trial.
Receivers’ decisions were collected during behavioral sessions,
which took place at the Nijmegen School of Management
decision laboratory. The fMRI experiment took place at the
Centre for Cognitive Neuroimaging at the Donders Institute
for Brain, Cognition and Behavior. The fMRI task was
presented using Matlab Psychtoolbox (Kleiner et al., 2007).
Participants read instructions and performed a belief elicitation
task as part of the instructions (75 mins in total) before
they were placed in the MRI scanner for approximately
60 min. The fMRI experiment consisted of the decision-
making phase and outcome phase. After the decision-making
phase, they saw a total of 88 outcome trials in the scanner,
equally divided between trust and lottery outcomes (during
the decision-making phase, participants also made choices
when the chance of reciprocation was 0%, respectively, 100%
chance. We excluded these decisions during the outcome
phase as there is no uncertainty and thus no influence of
individuals’ beliefs regarding their outcome). There were 15
outcome trials for each experimental condition and in addition
there were filler trials for other probabilities in the RTG
and RLOT that did not match participants’ beliefs. This
provided greater variety in decision contexts, and also made
it more difficult for participants to assess the individually
tailor-made structure.
The outcomes were presented in 18 blocks, with each block
consisting of five trials of either trust or lottery outcomes (four
outcome trials for block 17 and 18). Within each block, both
risky and ambiguous trials were presented in a random order. To
enhance attention to the outcome phase, we introduced payment
screens. After every two blocks, two outcomes were randomly
selected, one from the lottery and one from the trust condition,
which counted toward participants’ earnings. Each token was
converted to 10 eurocents.
After the experiment subjects were paid out in cash
dependent on their choices and randomly selected outcomes,
and the accuracy of their stated beliefs. Notably, no
deception was used in this experiment. Please see the
appendix for the instructions and a detailed explanation of
the payment scheme.
Image Acquisition and Preprocessing
Functional neuroimaging data was collected on a 3-Tesla Siemens
MRI system (Skyra) at the Donders Centre for Cognitive
Neuroimaging in Nijmegen, Netherlands. Images were acquired
using a 32-channel head coil, with a standard multi-echo
imaging pulse T2∗-weighted sequence (field of view = 224 mm,
matrix = 64 × 64, repetition time (TR) = 2390 ms; echo times
(TE) = 9.4, 20.6, 32.0, 43.0, and 54.0 ms, flip angle = 90◦, slice
gap = 0.5 mm). Using a multi-echo sequence provides a better
signal-to-noise ratio for brain areas susceptible to dropout, while
allowing for scanning of the whole brain (Poser et al., 2006). One
whole-brain volume consisted of thirty-one ascending slices (slice
thickness = 3.0 mm, voxel size = 3.5 mm × 3.5 mm × 3.0 mm).
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For each participant we acquired a high-resolution anatomical
T1-weighted image (MPRAGE; 192 slices; TR = 2300 ms, voxel
size = 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm). Participants’ heads were loosely
taped to the coil within the scanner in order to limit movement
during image acquisition.
fMRI data analysis was performed using SPM12 (Statistical
Parametric Mapping; Friston et al., 2007). Prior to preprocessing
we combined and realigned the five read-outs acquired via the
multi-echo sequence by using standard procedures described by
Poser et al. (2006). The first five volumes, acquired prior to
task initiation, were used to estimate the weighted echo time
per voxel for optimal echo combination including allowing T1
equilibration effects. These five volumes were then discarded
from the analysis (Poser et al., 2006). After echos were combined,
preprocessing consisted of slice-timing to the middle slice,
co-registration of the functional images to the anatomical images,
segmentation of the functional and anatomical image, and
normalization to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
template using the segmentation parameters. Functional images
were then smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width
at half maximum (FWHM).
Data Analyses
Behavioral Parameters
In this study we were interested in the question of whether
decision-makers’ beliefs about the outcomes of their choices
would act as a cue for reward anticipation, and whether this might
differ across conditions. In the RTG and RLOT participants do
not face uncertainty as they receive objective probabilities (in line
with the beliefs we elicit in the ATG), which naturally act as cue
for reward anticipation.
In the ambiguous social context (the ATG), we elicited
beliefs regarding the reciprocity of receivers before participants
made investment decisions during the experiment. During
the decision-making phase of this experiment, we observe
participants’ actual investment choices and assume they stem
from their individual subjective beliefs. It is therefore crucial
that we establish a relationship between participants’ a priori
beliefs and the investment choices they make in the ATG and
the ALOT. Therefore, we will first examine whether indeed
participants base their investment choices in the ATG and ALOT
on their subjective expectations, and subsequently test whether
participants’ investment levels different across our experimental
conditions. These analyses consist of a linear mixed effects model
(estimated with the toolboxes lme4 and lmerTest in R). The
results section details the variables, random intercepts, and slopes
included in this model.
Neuroimaging Analyses
To study the neural mechanisms of reward anticipation and
outcome delivery, the primary explanatory variables (EV)
of our general linear model (GLM) examined the BOLD
response during trials in which participants reviewed their
previously made choices and awaited their outcome (fourth
screen in Figure 2). Four EV’s indicated the onset of the
anticipation screens, modeled for a duration of 3500 ms,
when participants reviewed decisions from the RTG (belief-
corresponding risky trials), ATG, RLOT (belief- corresponding
risky trials), and ALOT. To examine whether participant’s
investment behavior served as a cue that would trigger expected
rewards, we added this variable as parametric modulator to
these four EV’s.
Other EV’s in this model included the other review decisions
from the RTG and RLOT filler trials (not corresponding to
participants’ beliefs), the trust or lottery cue (second screen
in Figure 2), trials in which participants had not made a
choice within the required 2 s (modeled at the onset of the
anticipation screen for the full duration of the remainder of
the trial), one outcome screen that coded a “win” (investment
gets transferred back), one outcome screen that coded a ‘loss’
(participant loses investment), and finally one EV that modeled
the nine payment information screens. The remaining events are
the fixation and blank screen, which are therefore considered the
implicit baseline.
When we were specifically interested in analyzing the BOLD
responses of the actual outcomes, separated as wins and losses,
we added the investment choices as parametric modulators to
the outcome period, and entered these as the first variables to
our model, otherwise similar as the model discussed above, in
order to allow for sufficient explanatory variance regarding these
parametric modulators.
All regressors were modeled with a canonical hemodynamic
response function. To account for motion, we included the six
head movement parameters together with their squared value
and the temporal derivatives as nuisance regressors. A standard
high-pass filter (cut-off 128 s) and auroregressive AR (1) model
were used during the GLM analysis to account for possible
slow-frequency drifts and temporal autocorrelation, respectively.
Our primary contrasts of interest are the anticipated
rewards, as a function of the earlier chosen investment levels,
re-evaluated during anticipation compared to implicit baseline,
the specific neural mechanisms of anticipating outcomes as
a function of source (social: anticipation ATG and RTG as
compared to non-social: anticipation ALOT and RLOT), and
comparing types of uncertainty (risk: RTG and RLOT vs.
ambiguity: ATG and ALOT). Furthermore, we examine the
amount won (lost) during the outcome phase, indicated by
the investment level being reciprocated (held), compared to
implicit baseline.
For the specified contrasts outlined above, one-sample t-tests
were performed as second-level models to analyze group effects.
Participants’ beliefs were added as a covariate at the group
level. Statistical maps with an initial threshold of uncorrected
p < 0.001 were established and were subsequently corrected
for multiple comparisons using a Family Wise Error corrected
cluster threshold of p < 0.05. As our hypotheses are centered
on the role of the striatum during belief-mediated anticipation
and outcome, we apply a small volume correction based on an
a priori region defined by meta-analysis (Bartra et al., 2013), using
specific coordinates for left striatum [−12, 12, −6] and right
striatum [12, 10,−6], each with a radius of 10 mm.
Finally, the raw data and code used here will be made available
by the authors to any qualified researcher.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 June 2019 | Volume 13 | Article 660
fnins-13-00660 June 24, 2019 Time: 15:17 # 7
Fairley et al. Subjective Beliefs About Trust
FIGURE 3 | Elicited beliefs regarding receivers’ reciprocity influenced chosen transfer in the ambiguous trust game Panel (A). Based on individual beliefs,
participants received a matching amount of winning colors in the ambiguous lottery. Participants used this information, given during instructions prior to the
experiment in the MRI scanner, as transfer positively increased as a function of the amount of winning colors Panel (B).
RESULTS
Beliefs and Decision-Making Under
Ambiguity
Individual beliefs regarding the likelihood that receivers will
reciprocate varied substantially. Some participants indicated
quite low belief in receiver reciprocity, expecting only two or
three of nine receivers to reciprocate their investment. On the
other hand, some participants believed that six of nine receivers
would return their investment.
Figure 3A illustrates that individual beliefs, elicited prior to
the investment choice, positively correlated with the amount
they subsequently invested in the ATG (Pearson’s r = 0.620,
p = 0.004). That is, the larger the number of reciprocators that
our participants thought would be present in a group of nine
receivers, the more tokens they were willing to invest.
We also found a positive relationship between the amount of
winning colors and participants’ investment choices in the ALOT
(Pearson’s r = 0.587, p = 0.006, see Figure 3B). Thus, as expected,
in both social and non-social contexts, the higher the subjective
probability of receiving half of the tripled investment back, the
more tokens participants were prepared to invest.
Although these results may appear intuitive, they are
important for the neuroimaging analyses. When we add
participant’s investment choices to our fMRI models we can
reliably state that these investments are guided by their individual
beliefs. Any difference we find across conditions is therefore
unlikely to be the result of a mismatch between subjective
probabilities (based on participants’ beliefs from the ATG), the
underlying likelihood in the ALOT, or objective probabilities in
the risk treatments.
Participants’ beliefs also interacted with our experimental
conditions resulting in interesting investment patterns in the
Trust Game and lotteries. In a companion paper we focus
FIGURE 4 | Overview of transfer choices across conditions. Participants
invest less in the ambiguous conditions [both in Trust Game (TG) and lottery
(LOT)] than the risky conditions. This effect is highly influenced by beliefs. The
general pattern of ambiguity aversion only holds for participants with low
beliefs in trustees (and number of winning colors). There was no effect of
sources of uncertainty: participants do not alter their transfer between the TG
and the LOT.
exclusively on the decision-making phase and present its
neuroimaging analyses – here we only look at the outcome phase
in relation to beliefs – but for clarity we provide a short behavioral
overview of investment behavior here. The mean transfer in the
experiment, across conditions and subjects, was 3.83 tokens. In
Figure 4, participants’ transfers are shown across conditions. In
general, participants invested more in the risky conditions than in
the ambiguous conditions, illustrating ambiguity aversion. This
general pattern, however, was strongly influenced by individual
beliefs, namely that the higher were beliefs regarding reciprocity
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in the ATG (and number of winning colors in the ALOT),
the more ambiguity averse behavior was displayed. This result
is similar to findings from experimental economics, which
show variability in ambiguity aversion along the probability
distribution (Trautmann and van de Kuilen, 2014). These results
are confirmed by a linear mixed-effects model which consisted of
participants’ transfers as the dependent variable, and type (risk
vs. ambiguity) and source (Trust Game vs. lottery) of uncertainty
as independent factors, along with gender, participants’ beliefs,
trial number, and an interaction of beliefs and both experimental
factors. A random intercept and two random slopes accounted
for clustering at the participant level and repeated trials within
experimental conditions. Confirming the bivariate correlation
between beliefs and investment choice, the mixed effects model
underlined the significance of participants’ beliefs (β = 0.891,
p = 0.002 via Satterthwaite’s method) and their interaction with
the type of uncertainty (β = 0.538, p = 0.025 via Satterthwaite’s
method). Although the variable trial number was also negatively
significant (p = 0.027) – indicating that as participants progress
through the experiment they transfer less – its economic
significance was rather small (β =−0.006).
Imaging Data
We first focused on the observed neural activity during the
anticipation phase. To check whether participants were actually
observing their previously made choices, we first examined the
BOLD signal during all anticipation screens (fourth screen in
Figure 2). Various brain regions were active – parahippocampal
cortex (peak activation: −8, −52, 0, 1282 voxels, p < 0.001),
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (peak activation: −32, 10, 56, 63
voxels, p = 0.007), and control network (peak activation: −50,
−52, 38, 64 voxels, p = 0.007) – which, based on the NeuroSynth
database (Yarkoni et al., 2011), are very likely to be involved in
attentional and memory processes.
More importantly, we then added participants’ investment
level as parametric modulator, allowing us to ask whether
trials on which the most tokens were invested showed a
greater expected reward signal while participants reviewed their
chosen investment prior to seeing the outcome. When we
focused on investment choices during the anticipation phase
across all experimental conditions (ALOT, RLOT, ATG, RTG),
no subthreshold clusters were found. We then looked at the
social and non-social anticipatory outcomes separately. Analyses
here demonstrated that the more that was invested in the
Trust Game, the more activation was observed bilaterally in
the ventral striatum (peak activations: −4, 7, −7 and 6,
4, −7, 11 voxels, p = 0.025 after small volume correction,
see Figure 5), whereas no regions surpassed this threshold during
the lottery outcomes. A direct comparison of investment levels
in the Trust Game versus the lottery also revealed an area
in the ventral striatum bilaterally, as part of an area which
extended into the orbitofrontal cortex (peak activations: −8,
21, −4 and −15, 35, −7, 18 voxels, p = 0.020 after small
volume correction).
Next, we explored the different types of uncertainty
anticipation, namely comparing risky versus ambiguous
trials, but found no significant neural effects for this contrast.
Even when we restricted the analysis to a functional ROI based
on the contrast which described investment levels between Trust
Game and lottery, we did not observe activation in this area.
FIGURE 5 | Bilateral activation in the ventral striatum as a function of participants’ investment choices during the anticipation of their social outcomes. The color map
defines the strength of the contrast’s T-scores (Statistical maps with an initial threshold of uncorrected p < 0.001 were established and were subsequently corrected
for multiple comparisons using a Family Wise Error corrected cluster threshold of p < 0.05).
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FIGURE 6 | Bilateral activation in the amygdala, left ventral striatum and right dorsal striatum as a function of participants’ investment choices during the delivery of
their outcomes. The color map defines the strength of the contrast’s T-scores (Statistical maps with an initial threshold of uncorrected p < 0.001 were established
and were subsequently corrected for multiple comparisons using a Family Wise Error corrected cluster threshold of p < 0.05).
We also examined the question of neural differences when
outcomes were finally resolved. We investigated the investment
amount as a parametric modulator when experiencing a
win during the outcome phase, collapsed across experimental
conditions (last screen in Figure 2). This contrast yielded
strong bilateral activation in an area encompassing the amygdala
bilaterally, left ventral striatum and right dorsal striatum (left
hemisphere peak activations: −22, −14, −10 and −18, 7, −18,
193 voxels, p< 0.001 whole brain analysis; right hemisphere peak
activations: 20, −7, −7 and 20, 18, −10, 84 voxels, p = 0.003
whole brain analysis, see Figure 6). The investment amount as
parametric modulator for a loss did not show any significant
activation patterns.
We further investigated whether individual differences in
attitudes toward social and ambiguity preferences might explain
variance in neural data. Individuals’ social preferences were
defined as a normalized score between −1 to 1 where a score
above (below) 0 indicated a person who invested more (less)
with a person in the TG than the lottery. Individuals’ ambiguity
preferences were also defined as a normalized score between
−1 to 1 where a score above (below) 0 indicated a person
who was ambiguity averse (seeking). When we added social
preferences as a covariate to the contrast which investigated
neural differences in investment levels in the Trust Game versus
the lottery, we observed the right motor and somatosensory
cortex activation (p = 0.015 whole brain). Individuals’ ambiguity
preferences as covariates for the contrast investment levels in the
ambiguous versus the risky settings did not yield any significant
neural findings.
DISCUSSION
Reward is an important and well-studied topic in the field of
Neuroscience (Bartra et al., 2013). Initiated by innovative primate
studies, a growing literature has emerged examining the putative
dopaminergic modulation of reward (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz,
1998). Our study sought to address scenarios when anticipated
rewards stem from individuals’ own beliefs and subsequent
decision-making, instead of relying on cue-outcome associations
that are typically evident in tasks such as the MID and multiround
Trust Games. In this experiment, we examined the strength of
individual beliefs, their relationship with subsequent decisions,
and their associated neural mechanisms when anticipating their
outcomes. These questions were explored in a real-life decision-
making context, in which outcomes were clearly (and non-
deceptively) resolved. We asked whether these belief-mediated
anticipated rewards were neurally processed in the manner of
an expected reward signal, similar to how rewards are evoked
through abstract cue-outcome associations.
Our decision-making task distinguished between social (Trust
Game context) and non-social (lottery context) sources of
uncertainty, as well as risk and ambiguity as types of uncertainty.
Choices made by participants in both the Trust Game and the
lottery tasks indicated clearly that underlying beliefs did in fact
guide participants’ decision-making. Participants invested more
when they expected a greater number of their potential game
partners to reciprocate their investment in the ATG. Similarly,
participants in the ALOT invested most when they knew a
greater number of colors out of the nine possible colors would
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lead to a return on their investment. Subsequently, individuals’
investment behavior is also influenced by their beliefs: the higher
beliefs regarding reciprocity were in the ATG (and number
of winning colors in the ALOT), the more ambiguity averse
behavior was displayed.
Our neuroimaging analyses then focused on whether these
belief-related expectation signals were evident in brain regions
related to standard cue-based reward anticipation. We found
confirmatory evidence of this in the Trust Game. The greater
the expectation of receiving a back-transfer in the Trust
Game, the greater the investment amount that was made,
and in turn the greater the activation in bilateral ventral
striatum prior to the outcome being presented, as compared
to anticipation in the lottery context. Anticipating the outcome
of whether your investment is reciprocated by another person
versus a lottery is likely more salient as it depends on
subjective assessments of trusting and engaging with another
people and its outcome results from their intentional behavior,
which aspects are of course absent when interacting with a
mechanistic device. Also, one consequence of our experimental
approach is that participants in the ALOT did not actively
have to form a prior belief. A feature of dopaminergic
modulation of reward is that the more uncertain a reward
is, the more information the consequent outcome will allow
for updating of priors (Schultz, 2010). Although a different
ambiguous urn was constructed on every trial in the ALOT,
participants knew how many colors were winning colors. This
feature might have reduced the uncertainty in the ALOT as
compared to the ATG.
Our novel result illustrates that one’s own investment
choice, modulated by one’s expectations regarding receivers’
reciprocating behavior, can serve as an anticipatory cue. Here
though, the cue was neither externally created by character
vignettes (Delgado et al., 2005) nor learned in a Pavlovian
manner by pairing shapes to more or less trustworthy persons
in a social context (Fouragnan et al., 2013), but was rather
internally generated via participants’ own beliefs about the
world. This finding illustrates that eliciting participants’ beliefs
can be just as powerful in evoking anticipated reward signals
as specifically pairing abstract cues with explicit (social)
gains and losses.
We also showed that when participants were informed
about a positive outcome – that their trust decision was
reciprocated by a receiver in the Trust Game or that their
marble was drawn in the lottery – the degree of their
chosen investment level modulated the reward signal in the
left ventral striatum and right dorsal striatum. These effects
also highlight the potential of using participants’ own beliefs
in a real-life decision-making task when examining reward
and subjective value. Some other effects are also worth
exploring further.
A well-established finding is that losses are coded in the ventral
striatum (Bartra et al., 2013). However, experiencing a loss in
this study, that is, when the amount invested was not returned,
did not activate similar brain regions as compared to when a
trial was “won.” Notably though, participants in this task did
not actually lose money, but rather they lost the opportunity
of winning more money by receiving a part of the tripled
investment. When they lost, they still retained the non-invested
number of tokens, thus perhaps minimizing the effect of the
virtual loss. Moreover, it is found that positive effects are more
likely to be coded in the striatum than negative effects (Bartra
et al., 2013). These factors might explain this null finding with
regard to experiencing losses.
Secondly, we also did not find neural differences in the
anticipation of outcomes between ambiguous and risky
contexts. Our experimental design differs from earlier
explorations showing that various levels of uncertainty
modulate expected reward in the ventral striatum (Fiorillo
et al., 2003; Volz et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2006). Namely,
following standard practices in Economics (Wakker, 2010),
here we clearly distinguish between risk and ambiguity,
instead of varying uncertainty along a continuous distribution.
Although decision-making under risk and ambiguity appear
to be processed independently (Hsu et al., 2005; Huettel
et al., 2006), anticipating their respective outcomes does
not appear to differentially modulate neural processes.
It might be that passively observing prior decisions does
not sufficiently highlight the distinction between the types
of uncertainty. Whereas revealing outcomes of social vs.
non-social contexts emphasizes the role of the receiver and his
intentions as compared to a non-intentional random mechanistic
device, separating outcomes by types of uncertainty is likely
not as compelling.
In a broader context, this is also a limitation of our
experimental setup. We purposely separated the decision-making
phase from the outcome phase, as we did not want participants
to learn from the outcomes of their choices which could lead
to potential belief adaptation across the experiment. While
this means that our design can rule out learning effects, and
that we can reliably use the beliefs elicited prior to decision-
making, a downside of this procedure is that the re-evaluation
of the choices that participants undertake is quite passive.
Although we endeavored to enhance attention by including
payment screens, we would ideally engage participants more
intensively. Additionally it is worth noting that these results
are based on a rather small sample size, and as such deserve
follow-up exploration.
One interesting potential follow-up could be to design a
dynamic experiment in which participants would be able to
change future decision-making as a function of beliefs, which
would presumably be updated as participants learned about the
outcomes of prior choices, and beliefs could thus be elicited
at various moments throughout the fMRI experiment. This
would promote active engagement of both decision-making
and outcome attention as well as the interaction between
both phases as a function of belief updating, which moves
experimental approaches closer to how trust and reciprocity
are experienced in everyday life. This method could bridge
two important directions in the field of Decision Neuroscience:
namely, explorations of reward processing, which to date have
rather neglected the role of participants’ inherent beliefs, and the
analyses of beliefs, which have focused on how beliefs emerge
and are shaped (Vilares and Kording, 2011) but have examined
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less the interaction with expected value processing. Our study
offers a first attempt as to how participants’ own belief sets
are employed in the reward processing in the context of trust
and risky choice.
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